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Abstract
Illegal logging is a global concern, associated with severe negative environmental, social and economic impacts, such as
deforestation, degradation of biodiversity and loss of government revenues. Despite recent international efforts to combat
illegal logging activities, the problem remains widespread. While the academic literature on the subject is extensive, little
systematic research has been devoted to analysing the causes of illegal logging. Here, this knowledge gap is addressed with
a cross-national assessment of factors hypothesized to impact illegal logging. The logistic regression analysis conducted in
this study corroborates some widely held beliefs, but also provides some new insights on the factors that are important for
whether illegal logging is likely to be a problem. It is shown that, besides physical-geographic characteristics, a number of
factors relating to the level and speed of a country’s economic-institutional development are associated with illegal logging.
These include gross domestic product per capita, economic growth, voice and accountability, rule of law and control of corruption. The findings also have implications for existing policies to tackle illegal logging activities.
Keywords Governance · Corruption · Rule of law · Voice and accountability · Deforestation · Logistic regression

Introduction
Illegal logging is a global issue that affects both developing
and developed countries (e.g. FAO 2001; Contreras-Hermosilla 2002; Smith 2004; Alemagi and Kozak 2010). It
often leads to forest degradation and/or deforestation, thus
threatening not only valuable forest ecosystem services and
biodiversity, but also the welfare of those dependent on forest resources for their livelihoods (e.g. Hansen and Treue
2008; Reboredo 2013; Vasco et al. 2017; Bösch et al. 2018).
In addition, illegal logging and the related timber trade
deprive governments of important tax revenues, distort timber prices and hamper investments in the formal forest sector
(e.g. Tacconi 2007b; Li et al. 2008; Hoare 2015; Kleinschmit
et al. 2016a). At the same time, illegal logging may also be
connected to a general climate of lawlessness in which other
illegal activities (e.g. poaching and illegal wildlife trade,
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drug trafficking, money laundering) are facilitated (Glastra
1999; Seneca Creek Associates and Wood Resources International 2004a).
The issue has been gaining prominence in international
policy discussions since the 1990s. For instance, illegal
logging was included in the 1998 G8 Action Programme
on Forests (Humphreys 2006; Hoare 2015). In 2003, the
European Union (EU) adopted the Forest Law Enforcement,
Governance and Trade (FLEGT) Action Plan with the aim
of reducing illegal logging activities by strengthening legal
forest management, improving governance and encouraging
trade in legally sourced timber (Dieter 2009; Hoare 2015).
In 2008, the USA amended the Lacey Act of 1900 with
the adoption of the Legal Timber Protection Act (LTPA).
Soon afterwards, similar laws were introduced in the EU
and Australia: the EU Timber Regulation (EUTR) in 2010
and the Australian Illegal Logging Prohibition Act (ILPA)
in 2012. All three legislations prohibit the import of timber
harvested in contravention to the laws of the country of origin (Lambin et al. 2014; Leipold and Winkel 2016; Leipold
et al. 2016). However, despite these global efforts to combat illegal logging over the last few decades, recent studies
indicate that the problem remains widespread. According to
Nellemann and Interpol Environmental Crime Programme
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(2012), illegal logging comprises as much as 15–30% of
total worldwide logging. Hoare (2015) reports that the share
of illegal timber in international trade has remained roughly
the same since the turn of the century. Thus, further actions
and international collaboration are required to combat the
problem (Kleinschmit et al. 2016a).
Understanding the causes of illegal logging is a necessary prerequisite to improve existing policy measures (or
design new ones). Given its far-reaching environmental,
social and economic implications, surprisingly little systematic research has been devoted to analysing the general
causes of illegal logging. Most of the existing information
about the causes of illegal logging activities in the literature
is based on anecdotal evidence (e.g. from context-specific
stakeholder interviews) or appears to be speculative. A
few country-level studies (e.g. Palmer 2001; Smith et al.
2003; McElwee 2004; Hansen and Treue 2008; Alemagi
and Kozak 2010; Miller 2011) and multi-country reports
(e.g. Karsenty 2003; Seneca Creek Associates and Wood
Resources International 2004a; Contreras-Hermosilla et al.
2007; Hoare 2015; Kleinschmit et al. 2016b) assume factors
such as corruption, conflicts and population growth to be
general causes of illegal logging. However, these assumptions have not yet been empirically evaluated. This is the
objective of the present study.
A quantitative cross-national study appears to be wellsuited to generate some robust insights on the factors that
are associated with illegal logging. Specifically, I build a
logistic regression model and test a series of literature-based
hypotheses. In doing so, I aim at answering the following
research questions: Are there some generalizable lessons on
why some countries are affected by illegal logging, while
others are not? Are there identifiable aggregate-level factors
that are related to the illegal harvesting of wood? It is worth
mentioning that this study will not present new evidence on
illegal logging in particular countries. Instead, I use currently available information on national illegal logging rates
to see whether I can find common patterns across countries
and attempt to derive policy recommendations regarding
global illegal logging. In addition, due to the necessary level
of aggregation for such a study, the analysis will not be sensitive to subnational variation in illegal logging, different
forest types and different patterns of wood use (e.g. Burgess
1993; Barbier et al. 2019).

Methods and data
Defining illegal logging
There is no internationally agreed definition of illegal logging. Existing definitions range from a rather narrow understanding referring to logging outside concession boundaries
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or extracting more timber than authorized, to broad definitions including all activities of timber processing, transporting and trading in violation of national (or subnational)
laws (e.g. Kleinschmit et al. 2016a). While especially nongovernmental and governmental organizations tend to differ
in their assessment of what constitutes illegal logging, many
studies and reports acknowledge the multifaceted and complex nature of illegal logging activities and agree that there
is not just one type but various types of illegal logging (e.g.
Turner et al. 2008; Kleinschmit et al. 2016a). Sometimes,
illegal logging is equated with unsustainable timber harvesting practices. However, this is not always true. Logging may
technically be illegal, yet sustainable, or legal, yet unsustainable (Contreras-Hermosilla et al. 2007).
The clandestine nature of illegal logging makes it difficult
to find accurate and reliable data on its scope (e.g. Brack
2005; Contreras-Hermosilla et al. 2007). Nevertheless,
country-specific case studies (e.g. Palmer 2001; Hansen and
Treue 2008) as well as assessments at the multiple-country
level (e.g. Seneca Creek Associates and Wood Resources
International 2004a; Lawson and MacFaul 2010; Hoare
2015) publish from time to time detailed figures on the
extent of illegal logging and the related timber trade. Usually, these estimates show a large variation, depending on
the year of investigation, the definition of illegal logging, but
also on the methods used (Kleinschmit et al. 2016a). Thus,
it is often not possible to directly compare these estimates
(for details, see for example Seneca Creek Associates and
Wood Resources International 2004a; Hansen and Treue
2008; Dieter 2009; Gan et al. 2016).
For the present study, it is essential to use a dataset that
is as consistent and comprehensive as possible. Therefore, I
rely on the extensive list by Li et al. (2008) with illegal logging rates for industrial roundwood for almost all countries
of the world. Most of the information in the list by Li et al.
(2008) is based on the influential study by Seneca Creek
Associates and Wood Resources International (2004a). This
independent assessment used expert interviews conducted
in the producer countries to derive illegal logging rates.1
The estimates in the list by Li et al. (2008) refer to a rather
narrow definition of illegal logging, originally employed
in the assessment by Seneca Creek Associates and Wood
Resources International (2004a). This definition involves
four types of illicit activities: (1) harvesting without authority in designated national parks or forest reserves; (2) harvesting without authorization or in excess of concession

1

Illegal timber trade was estimated with wood flow (import
source) analysis, i.e. by multiplying illegal logging rates from the
expert interviews by trade volumes reported in official statistics (for
details on the methodology, see Seneca Creek Associates and Wood
Resources International (2004a: 1–4)).
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permit limit; (3) failing to report harvesting activities to
avoid royalty payment or taxes; and (4) violation of international trading rules or agreements, such as export bans or
CITES. This clear definition covers most of the concerns
raised by the international community and thus appears to
provide an appropriate perspective for the purpose of this
study (e.g. Turner et al. 2007; Dieter 2009).
The list by Li et al. (2008), with estimates for the year
2004, constitutes the most recent information available on
illegal logging rates for a large sample of countries. The
study has often been used as a basis for applied research on
illegal logging (e.g. Turner et al. 2008; Dieter 2009; Dieter
et al. 2012). Yet, several aspects imply a certain degree of
data uncertainty: first, expert interviews come with some
limitations. For instance, the validity of the illegal logging
estimates depends on the selection of experts in the different countries and their knowledge of the subject (Gan et al.
2016). Moreover, it is possible that interview responses
may be influenced to some extent by different cultural backgrounds (e.g. Scheuch 1993; Buil et al. 2012; Hoare 2015).
Second, Li et al. (2008) supplemented the data for a few
countries by estimates from other studies (i.e. Miller et al.
2006; Contreras-Hermosilla et al. 2007).2 Third, Li et al.
(2008) did not publish point estimates, but upper and lower
bound estimates (i.e. a range of percentages) of illegally
logged industrial roundwood (subdivided into sawlogs and
pulpwood). I therefore decided to follow the approach taken
in the deforestation studies by Deacon (1994) and Rudel
and Roper (1996, 1997b) for addressing data imprecisions
and used the information from the list to construct a binary
measure of illegal logging as either high or low in a country.
For the statistical analysis, I followed Li et al. (2008),
Turner et al. (2008), Dieter (2009) and Dieter et al. (2012)
and first combined the information for sawlogs and pulpwood. For this purpose, I calculated the weighted average
of the rates for sawlogs and pulpwood based on their respective production quantities in the different countries in 2004.
This resulted in upper and lower bound estimates of illegal
logging rates for industrial roundwood.3 Then, I took the
upper bound (i.e. the less conservative) estimates and constructed a dichotomized measure of the illegal logging rates
as being either “high” (more than 25% of total production
from illegal sources; value = 1) or “low” (less than 25% of

2
In detail, estimates from Miller et al. (2006) were taken for Bangladesh, Costa Rica, China, Estonia, Latvia, Papua New Guinea and
Peru. Estimates from Contreras-Hermosilla et al. (2007) were taken
for Albania, Azerbaijan, Benin, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cambodia,
Colombia, Ecuador, Georgia, Ghana, Indonesia, Mozambique, Honduras, Malaysia, Myanmar, Nicaragua and Russia.
3
I calculated the arithmetic mean of these upper and lower bound
estimates to construct a continuous dependent variable, which is used
for a robustness check in the discussion.
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total production from illegal sources; value = 0) in a country.
I chose 25% as a cut-off point, as only very few countries
have scores close to it (Rudel and Roper 1997b). Moreover,
this cut-off point also seems reasonable to make sure that
only illegal logging activities of a nature or degree warranting international attention are considered (Seneca Creek
Associates and Wood Resources International 2004a). Due
to lack of reliable data, seven countries listed by Li et al.
(2008) had to be excluded from the analysis (Cuba, Djibouti,
North Korea, Somalia, Syria, Venezuela and Yemen). The
final sample includes 163 countries (see "Appendix 1"): 100
countries (61.3%) have low levels of illegal logging (e.g.
Argentina, Australia, Botswana, Lithuania, Sri Lanka, Thailand), while 63 countries (38.7%) are affected by high illegal
logging according to my definition (e.g. Brazil, Bulgaria,
Estonia, Ghana, Indonesia, Russia). This is in line with estimates by Toyne et al. (2002) and Tacconi (2007c), which
indicate that illegal logging is a problem in about 70 countries around the world.4

Explanatory variables
The selection of potential explanatory variables is based on
an extensive literature review. This means that I scrutinized
the illegal logging literature (e.g. Seneca Creek Associates
and Wood Resources International 2004a; Contreras-Hermosilla et al. 2007; Tacconi 2007a; Hoare 2015; Kleinschmit
et al. 2016b) to identify those factors that have been assumed
to be causes of illegal logging in one or more publications.
In the following sections, I discuss all included variables in
detail (see also Table 1). To avoid possible bias due to the
influence of extreme values I used variables averaged out
over the period 2000–2004. Table 2 presents sample descriptive statistics.
Aspects of institutional quality
The literature points to several aspects of poor institutional
quality (or governance) that may lead to increased illegal
logging activities in a country. Six dimensions seem to be
particularly important:
First, it has been suggested that nations with low levels
of democracy and accountability may have relatively high
levels of illegal logging activities (e.g. Palmer 2001; Contreras-Hermosilla 2002; Kleinschmit et al. 2016a). This is
because non-democratic governments do not have to be as
4

Neither Toyne et al. (2002) nor Tacconi (2007c) explicitly name the
countries that have issues with illegal logging. Yet, the book edited
by Tacconi (2007a) includes case studies from the illegal logging hotspots Bolivia, Brazil, Cameroon, Honduras, Indonesia and Nicaragua.
All of these countries are affected by “high” illegal logging according
to my definition.
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Table 1  Explanatory variables (averaged out over the period 2000–2004)
Variable

Description

Exp. sign Source

Voice and accountability

Higher values correspond to better outcomes (scaled to lie
between − 2.5 and + 2.5)
Political stability and absence of violence Higher values correspond to better outcomes (scaled to lie
between − 2.5 and + 2.5)
Government effectiveness
Higher values correspond to better outcomes (scaled to lie
between − 2.5 and + 2.5)
Regulatory quality
Higher values correspond to better outcomes (scaled to lie
between − 2.5 and + 2.5)
Rule of law
Higher values correspond to better outcomes (scaled to lie
between − 2.5 and + 2.5)
Control of corruption
Higher values correspond to better outcomes (scaled to lie
between − 2.5 and + 2.5)
GDP per capita
Gross domestic product per capita, PPP (ln; constant 2017 international $)
Economic growth
Gross domestic product growth rate (% annual change)
Exports of industrial roundwood
Exports of industrial roundwood (m3; % of world total)
Population growth
(% annual change)
Tropical climate
Land area that has any of the four Köppen–Geiger tropical
climates (%)
Forest area
(million ha)

Table 2  Descriptive statistics
(variables are averaged out over
the period 2000–2004)

WGI (2018)

–

WGI (2018)

–

WGI (2018)

–

WGI (2018)

–

WGI (2018)

–

WGI (2018)

–

World Bank (2021)

+ /–
+
+
+

World Bank (2021)
FAO (2021)
World Bank (2021)
Nunn and Puga (2012)

+

FAO (2021)

Variables

Mean

Standard deviation

Min

Max

Voice and accountability
Political stability and absence of violence
Government effectiveness
Regulatory quality
Rule of law
Control of corruption
GDP per capita
Economic growth
Exports of industrial roundwood
Population growth
Tropical climate
Forest area

− 0.061
− 0.082
− 0.018
− 0.020
− 0.079
− 0.058
8.989
4.371
0.611
1.480
38.986
24.288

0.975
0.968
0.981
0.958
0.996
1.013
1.232
3.445
2.670
1.331
44.723
84.929

− 2.064
− 2.268
− 1.805
− 2.111
− 1.757
− 1.538
6.578
− 6.663
0.000
− 1.240
0.000
0.000

1.626
1.696
2.178
1.918
1.971
2.436
11.498
30.602
31.050
6.268
100.000
809.077

responsive to environmental activism as democratic governments (lack of electoral accountability). Moreover, such
activism is usually less pronounced in non-democratic countries due to lower levels of freedoms like press, speech and
assembly (e.g. Ehrhardt-Martinez et al. 2002; Shandra et al.
2011). Consequently, consultation with citizens in decisions
related to environmental problems such as illegal logging is
less likely in non-democratic countries.
Second, illegal logging activities are assumed to be
facilitated in periods of political crisis and armed conflict
(e.g. Karsenty 2003; Seneca Creek Associates and Wood
Resources International 2004a; Alemagi and Kozak 2010;
Pokorny et al. 2016). This is not least because people usually
face shorter time horizons and higher discount rates during
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periods of war and political instability, and thus log as fast
and as much as they can to maximize profits and minimize
risk (Burgess et al. 2015). Moreover, armed groups are frequently reported to cut down trees in conflict zones to buy
weaponry or to fund other illicit activities (Richards et al.
2003; Burgess et al. 2015).
Third, the literature mentions that countries with weak
government institutions may have higher levels of illegal
logging. In particular, a lack of government capacity (or
willingness) to develop and enforce laws and regulations
is believed to contribute to illegal harvesting of wood (e.g.
Seneca Creek Associates and Wood Resources International 2004a; Contreras-Hermosilla et al. 2007; Tacconi
2007b). Such situations may be exacerbated when there
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are overlapping responsibilities between central and lowerlevel governments, for instance, due to poorly implemented
decentralization processes (Richards et al. 2003; Tacconi
2007c; Hoare 2015).
Fourth, an incoherent legislative and regulatory framework is assumed to lead to illegal logging (e.g. Richards
et al. 2003; Tacconi 2007c; Hoare 2015; Pokorny et al.
2016). In many countries, environmental and forestry laws
are described as unclear, outdated, constantly changing and/
or playing only a marginal role (e.g. Palmer 2001; Brack
2003; Zimmerman and Kormos 2012; Pokorny et al. 2016).
As a result, such laws are open to individual interpretation
and easier to bend, thus providing incentives for illegal harvesting of wood (Tacconi 2007b).
Fifth, countries where the rule of law is weak or inoperable are assumed to provide fertile ground for illegal logging,
as investigations may be delayed and many crimes go unpunished (e.g. Seneca Creek Associates and Wood Resources
International 2004a; Brack 2005; Hansen and Treue 2008;
Schloenhardt 2008; Alemagi and Kozak 2010). Moreover,
long-term investments in sustainable forest management
may be discouraged in countries where the rule of law is
weak and property rights are not protected (e.g. ContrerasHermosilla 2002; Contreras-Hermosilla et al. 2007).
Sixth, the presence of corruption is frequently mentioned
as a possible explanation for illegal logging activities (e.g.
Palmer 2001; Richards et al. 2003; Smith et al. 2003; McElwee 2004; Alemagi and Kozak 2010; Miller 2011; Sikor and
To 2011). Corruption in the forestry sector can take different
forms, ranging from relatively low-level activities such as
bribing officials to allow illegal timber through checkpoints
(“petty corruption”), to more serious offences involving
large sums of money (“grand corruption”), for example,
paying bribes to politicians for the allocation of logging
concessions (Hoare 2015; Pokorny et al. 2016; Meehan and
Tacconi 2017; Sommer 2017, 2018).
The extent to which (1) low levels of democracy and
accountability, (2) political crises and conflicts, (3) weak
government institutions, (4) an incoherent legislative and
regulatory framework, (5) a weak rule of law and (6) corruption are associated with illegal logging is investigated
by using the six indicators of the Worldwide Governance
Indicators (WGI) project of the World Bank (WGI 2018)5:
1. The “voice and accountability” indicator captures “perceptions of the extent to which a country’s citizens are
able to participate in selecting their government, as well

5
The WGI measure the quality of governance based on more than 30
underlying data sources that report the views and experiences of people from around the world on the quality of various aspects of governance (Kaufmann et al. 2011).
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2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

as freedom of expression, freedom of association and a
free media” (Kaufmann et al. 2011).
The “political stability and absence of violence” indicator captures “perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including politically motivated
violence and terrorism” (Kaufmann et al. 2011).
The “government effectiveness” indicator captures “perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of
the civil service and the degree of its independence from
political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and
implementation, and the credibility of the government’s
commitment to such policies” (Kaufmann et al. 2011).
The “regulatory quality” indicator captures “perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and
implement sound policies and regulations that permit
and promote private sector development” (Kaufmann
et al. 2011).
The “rule of law” indicator captures “perceptions of the
extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by
the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police and the
courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence”
(Kaufmann et al. 2011).
The “control of corruption” indicator captures “perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised
for private gain, including both petty and grand forms
of corruption, as well as ‘capture’ of the state by elites
and private interests” (Kaufmann et al. 2011).6

All six indicators are scaled to lie between − 2.5 and 2.5,
with higher values corresponding to better outcomes. Therefore, negative coefficients are expected in the regression:
improved voice and accountability, more political stability,
higher government effectiveness, improved regulatory quality, better rule of law and improved control of corruption
are all thought to correspond with lower levels of illegal
logging.
Gross domestic product per capita
It is suggested that lower national incomes and poverty are
associated with higher levels of illegal logging (e.g. Hiller
et al. 2004; Seneca Creek Associates and Wood Resources

6

An alternative for corruption would be the Corruption Perceptions
Index (CPI) of Transparency International. However, this index has
much fewer country observations for the period 2000–2004 than the
WGI “control of corruption” indicator. The same is true for disaggregated corruption data (e.g. the Quality of Government Institute [Dahlberg et al. 2020)], which account for both grand corruption in the
executive sector and petty corruption in the public sector (for recent
applications, see, for example, Sommer (2017, 2018)).
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International 2004a; Tacconi 2007c; Alemagi and Kozak
2010; Islam and Sato 2012). This is explained by the fact
that in low-income countries people are more likely to focus
on extractive (i.e. consumptive) values of forests than on
non-extractive and preservation values. Therefore, people
in poorer countries can be generally expected to be more
tolerant, or approve, of illegal logging activities than people in richer countries (Tacconi 2007b). A nation’s level of
wealth is thus assumed to be negatively related to illegal
logging. To address this hypothesis, I use gross domestic
product (GDP) per capita adjusted for purchasing power parity. These data, which are logged (ln), are obtained from the
World Bank (2021) and measured in constant international
dollars.
Economic growth
The literature points to two possible effects of national
economic growth on illegal logging, the net consequence
of which is uncertain (e.g. Tacconi 2007c; Pokorny et al.
2016). On the one hand, it is suggested that high economic
growth rates stimulate domestic demand for timber and forest products, such as pulp and paper. Potentially, this could
also increase illegal commercial harvesting (Pokorny et al.
2016). Therefore, a positive relationship between economic
growth and illegal logging would be expected. On the other
hand, high economic growth rates (often coupled with a
rising number of attractive employment opportunities in
other sectors) may also draw people away from the forest
and from working with (illegal) logging operations—usually
dangerous jobs done by the poorest people (Tacconi 2007d).
This would imply a negative relationship between economic
growth and illegal logging. In summary, the ex-ante expectations as to the effect of a country’s economic growth rate on
illegal logging are ambiguous. The data on annual growth
rates of GDP are obtained from the World Bank (2021).
Exports of industrial roundwood
International timber trade is frequently reported to support
illegal logging activities, especially in reports by non-governmental organizations (e.g. Glastra 1999; Brack 2005;
WWF 2005; Tacconi 2007b; Schloenhardt 2008; Köthke
2020). The logic is that not only domestic demand drives
illegal commercial harvesting, but globalization leads to new
prospects for exports to non-environmentally sensitive markets that demand timber without considering whether it was
harvested illegally (Tacconi 2007b). A variable capturing
the extent to which a country is integrated into international
trade is thus expected to be positively related to the level of
illegal logging. I use data on global market shares of industrial roundwood exports (i.e. a country’s exports of industrial roundwood divided by total world exports of industrial
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roundwood) provided by the FAO (2021) to address this
hypothesis.
Population growth
As suggested by neo-Malthusian theory, population growth
leads to a higher demand for land and natural resources and
thus also to a potential increase in illegal logging activities
(e.g. Seneca Creek Associates and Wood Resources International 2004b; Hoare 2015; Pokorny et al. 2016). In addition, a growing population is also suggested to affect illegal
logging indirectly through labour markets by creating an
abundant supply of labour and pushing down wage rates. In
such situations, illegal logging operators may find it easier to
recruit labour among the otherwise unemployed (e.g. Seneca
Creek Associates and Wood Resources International 2004b;
Islam and Sato 2012). For these reasons, population growth
is expected to be positively related to illegal logging operations in a country. This hypothesis is addressed using annual
population growth rates provided by the World Bank (2021).
Tropical climate
Illegal logging activities affect forests in many parts of the
world, but forests in tropical regions are commonly considered a key target (e.g. Seneca Creek Associates and Wood
Resources International 2004a; Hansen and Treue 2008; Gan
et al. 2016). This is not least because many tropical timber
species, such as mahogany, teak, rosewood and ebony, have
higher commercial values than others because of their cultural values and unique physical and chemical properties
(e.g. colour, texture, durability of wood). The higher value
generates higher incentives for illegal commercial harvesting
and trade (e.g. Richards et al. 2003; Shandra et al. 2011; Gan
et al. 2016).7 A variable capturing the fraction of a country
that has a tropical climate is thus expected to be positively
related to the level of illegal logging. I use data from Nunn
and Puga (2012) on the percentage of the land area of each
country that has any of the four Köppen–Geiger tropical
climates to address this hypothesis.
Forest area
Illegal logging activities can be expected to be more widespread in countries with large forest areas, simply because
there might be more opportunities to log illegally (Smith
2004; Shandra et al. 2012). In fact, the physical nature of
forest, i.e. vastness and the unbounded nature, may lead to
public unconcern about the forest environment and create an

7

Unfortunately, there is no detailed information on timber species
and associated values for the large sample of countries in this study.
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impression of forests as a free common good for everyone
(Kant and Redantz 1997; Geist and Lambin 2002; Culas
and Dutta 2003). In such a setting, people may have perceptions that illegal logging is not a harmful and/or a criminal
activity (Tacconi 2007c). Moreover, it is conjecturable that
controlling agencies in countries with vast forests away from
public scrutiny may have more difficulties in monitoring forest operations (Contreras-Hermosilla 2002). In order to capture such possible variations between countries that are not
covered by the other variables, a scaling variable is included
by using a country’s forest area as an explanatory variable.
The data are obtained from the FAO (2021).

Regression model
As described above, the list with illegal logging rates by Li
et al. (2008) is used to construct a dichotomized measure of
illegal logging as either high or low in country i in the year
2004. Logistic (or logit) regression is a regression technique
specifically designed for dichotomous dependent variables,
i.e. variables taking on a value of either 1 or 0 (for recent
applications, see for example Zbinden and Lee 2005; Béguin
et al. 2011; Zanella et al. 2014; Bösch et al. 2019).8 The
dependent variable yi can be formally described as:
{
1, if illegal logging is high
yi =
(1)
0, if illegal logging is low
Let xi be a k*1 vector of explanatory variables, β0 a constant, and β’ a k*1 vector of unknown coefficients. The probability of high illegal logging Prob(yi = 1) can be written as:
�

)
(
Prob yi = 1 = p =

e𝛽0 +𝛽 xi
1 + e𝛽0 +𝛽 � xi

(2)

The estimation form of the model is then given after the
logit transformation:
)
(
p
�
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽 xi
logit (p) = ln
(3)
1−p

Results
The results of the logistic regression, along with the appropriate test statistics, are illustrated in Table 3.9 Both McFadden’s and Nagelkerke’s pseudo-R2 suggest fairly good fits, as
they are well within the range of about 0.2 to 0.4 typically
estimated for logistic regression models (e.g. Harper et al.
1990; Zbinden and Lee 2005). Likelihood ratio test statistics
exceed the critical 𝜒 2 value at the 1% level in all six model
specifications. Each model specification contains one of the
six measures of institutional quality: voice and accountability (Specification 1), political stability and absence of
violence (Specification 2), government effectiveness (Specification 3), regulatory quality (Specification 4), rule of law
(Specification 5) and control of corruption (Specification 6).
These specifications are used for two reasons. First, multicollinearity problems are avoided. When all six measures
of institutional quality are included together in the analysis,
variance inflation factor scores for these six indicators are
greater than 10, indicating potential problems with multicollinearity (e.g. Tabachnick and Fidell 2013). This is probably
due to the high bivariate correlations among these variables
(see "Appendix 2"). Yet, the highest variance inflation score
is less than 3 in models where the effect of these variables
is investigated separately, indicating no potential problems
with multicollinearity. Second, the use of alternative model
specifications is generally considered a useful tactic in crossnational regression analysis: the sequential use of “cognate”
but “distinct” indicators of similar theoretical constructs can
help to provide further insights on the complexity of the
issue under investigation and increase the reliability of the
findings (e.g. Shandra 2007; Shandra et al. 2008).
As anticipated, the coefficients that represent the six
measures of institutional quality are found to be negatively
signed, i.e. higher levels of institutional quality correspond
with lower levels of illegal logging. Three measures of institutional quality are found to be statistically significant: the
coefficient for voice and accountability is significant at the
5% level, and the coefficients for rule of law and control of
corruption are significant at the 10% level. The coefficients
for political stability and absence of violence, government

9

8
Note that, due to the dichotomous scale of the dependent variable,
there is no assumption of homoscedasticity or equality of variance
(e.g. Pampel 2000; Menard 2010).

Except for their signs, logistic regression coefficients are hard to
interpret directly. Interpretation in terms of odds ratios is usually
considered the most intuitive way. Odds ratios are obtained by simply exponentiating the coefficients, that is, calculating exp(β). For
quantitative variables, it is helpful to subtract 1 from the odds ratio
and multiply by 100, that is, calculate 100(exp(β)-1). This yields the
percentage change in the odds for each one-unit increase in the independent variable (e.g. Pampel 2000; Allison 2012). For instance, the
estimated odds ratio of 0.490 for voice and accountability (Specification 1) indicates that a one-unit increase in this indicator is associated
with a 51.0% decrease in the predicted odds of illegal logging.
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Table 3  Logistic regression results
Specification 1

Specification 2

Variables

Coeff

SE

Odds ratio Coeff

Constant
Voice and accountability
Political stability and absence
of violence
Government effectiveness
Regulatory quality
Rule of law
Control of corruption
GDP per capita
Economic growth
Exports of industrial roundwood
Population growth
Tropical climate
Forest area
N
Likelihood ratio test
McFadden’s R2
Nagelkerke’s R2
Overall correct predictions

6.835***
− 0.713**

2.542
0.327

0.490

− 1.065*** 0.275
0.160*
0.085
0.273
0.220
0.185
0.014***
0.006

0.345
1.173
1.313

0.200
1.203
0.006
1.015
0.004
1.006
163
44.353***
0.408
0.570
84.7%

Specification 4
Coeff

SE

Constant
Voice and accountability
Political stability and absence
of violence
Government effectiveness
Regulatory quality
Rule of law
Control of corruption
GDP per capita
Economic growth
Exports of industrial roundwood
Population growth
Tropical climate
Forest area
N
Likelihood ratio test
McFadden’s R2
Nagelkerke’s R2
Overall correct predictions

8.849***

3.104

− 0.006

0.401

0.994

− 1.272*** 0.335
0.175**
0.083
0.212
0.205

0.280
1.191
1.236

*Significant at the 10% level
**Significant at the 5% level
***Significant at the 1% level
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8.285***

2.677

− 0.162

0.277

− 1.212*** 0.289
0.176**
0.084
0.222
0.203
0.262
0.011**
0.005

Odds ratio Coeff

Odds ratio Coeff

0.298
1.193
1.249

0.201
1.299
0.005
1.011
0.004
1.005
163
42.062***
0.387
0.547
84.7%

0.201
1.311
0.005
1.011
0.004
1.005
163
41.891***
0.385
0.546
82.2%

SE

Odds ratio

7.097**

3.098

− 0.403

0.437

0.668

− 1.089*** 0.330
0.180**
0.087
0.261
0.212

0.337
1.197
1.299

0.266
0.011**
0.006

0.197
1.304
0.005
1.011
0.004
1.006
163
42.321***
0.389
0.550
84.0%

Specification 6
Odds ratio Coeff

6.108**

2.870

− 0.676*

0.371

0.509

− 0.991*** 0.306
0.178**
0.086
0.290
0.215

0.371
1.195
1.337

0.269
0.011**
0.005

SE

0.851

Specification 5

Variables

0.271
0.011**
0.005

SE

Specification 3

0.198
1.309
0.005
1.011
0.004
1.005
163
43.619***
0.401
0.563
83.4%

SE

Odds ratio

6.081**

2.904

− 0.707*
− 0.985***
0.166*
0.295

0.413
0.309
0.085
0.217

0.290
0.010**
0.006

0.198
1.336
0.005
1.010
0.004
1.006
163
43.449***
0.400
0.561
85.3%

0.493
0.373
1.180
1.343
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effectiveness and regulatory quality fail to achieve a level of
statistical significance.
As expected, the coefficients for GDP per capita are negative and significant at the 1% level in every model specification.10 In all six model specifications, the coefficients for
economic growth are positively signed—the ex-ante expectations here were ambiguous. This finding suggests that
the effect of higher domestic demand for timber and forest
products in a growing economy is likely to be more important than the opposing effect of more attractive employment
opportunities in non-forest sectors. The coefficients for economic growth are significant at the 5% level in Specifications
2–5 and significant at the 10% level in Specifications 1 and
6.
The coefficients for exports of industrial roundwood are
positively signed as hypothesized, but are non-significant in
all six model specifications. Likewise, the coefficients for
population growth are positive as expected, but do not reach
a level of statistical significance in any model specification.11
As hypothesized, the coefficients for the tropical climate variable are positively signed and significant at the 1% level in
Specification 1 and at the 5% level in Specifications 2–6. The
coefficients for forest area are positive as anticipated, but are
non-significant in all six model specifications.12

Discussion and conclusions
Over the past two decades, the international community has
increasingly focused on illegal logging and its negative environmental, social and economic impacts. Major international
bodies such as the World Bank, the United Nations Forum
on Forests and the G8 have identified illegal logging as a
serious threat to the world’s forests (e.g. Kaimowitz 2003;
Ravenel and Granoff 2004; Brack 2005; Kleinschmit et al.
2016a). While there have been numerous quantitative analyses investigating the causes of deforestation (e.g. Angelsen
and Kaimowitz 1999; Geist and Lambin 2002), most of the

10

I replaced GDP per capita with other development-related variables, i.e. degree of urbanization and level of HDI (Human Development Index). The coefficients for both variables are negative and statistically significant in all model specifications. The other findings are
similar to the results presented in Table 3. I do not present the results
here for the sake of space.
11
I used different indicators to reflect the general concept of population pressure, i.e. total population and population density rather than
population growth. The coefficients for these variables fail to reach
statistical significance. The other findings are similar to the results
reported in Table 3 (not shown here for the sake of space).
12
I reran the models using land area instead of forest area. The
coefficients for this variable are non-significant. The other findings
remain similar to the results reported in Table 3 (not presented here
for the sake of space).
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existing information about the causes of illegal logging is
anecdotal or speculative. To my knowledge, this study is the
first quantitative research effort to analyse the factors that
are associated with global illegal logging. The results of the
cross-national logistic regression corroborate some widely
held beliefs, but also provide some new insights on the issue.
There are a few caveats to consider. Generally, the results,
as presented in this manuscript, should be interpreted with
reasonable care. This is, first of all, due to the simple and
somewhat imprecise measurement of the dependent variable. As a robustness check of the results, I replaced the
binary dependent variable with a continuous one (i.e. the
arithmetic mean of the upper and lower bound estimates of
illegal logging rates for industrial roundwood, as described
in the section “Methods and data”) and used the same set of
model specifications. The detailed results for the ordinary
least squares (OLS) regressions are shown in "Appendix
3". The coefficients for all variables that were found to be
significant at the 10% level or better in the logistic regression remained statistically significant at the 10% level or
better in the OLS regression. Moreover, the OLS regression confirmed the non-significant findings of the logistic
regression. Thus, it appears that the results of this study are
fairly robust, given the data limitations, the complexity of
the problem being analysed and the high level of aggregation
of the analysis. Yet, it should be emphasized that an explanatory variable found to be significant in the regression does
not automatically mean that it is a cause of illegal logging
in every country. In the first place, regression analysis tests
correlations between a set of explanatory variables and a
dependent variable—correlations do not necessarily imply
causal relationships. In addition, an explanatory variable
found to be significant in the regression points to a general
pattern across countries, which is likely to hold for most
countries, but exceptions to this pattern are possible (e.g.
Tole 1998; Angelsen and Kaimowitz 1999).
Furthermore, this study was carried out with highly
aggregated national-level data, although illegal logging
activities may not necessarily take place in the entire country. The Russian Far East, for instance, is reported to have
much higher illegal logging rates than the western part of
the country (Nellemann and Interpol Environmental Crime
Programme 2012; Gan et al. 2016). In other cases, the conditions that force people to cut down trees illegally may
extend well beyond the boundaries of individual nation
states (Rudel and Roper 1997a; Contreras-Hermosilla 2002).
Thus, there is probably some mismatch in scale between
explanatory preconditions and illegal logging on the ground,
which is inevitable in the context of such a cross-national
study. However, it is still justifiable to consider countries as
relatively homogeneous units, especially with regard to the
institutional-economic dimensions that appear to influence
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illegal logging activities (Rudel and Roper 1997b; Tallis
et al. 2009; Bösch et al. 2019).
The results of this study indicate that physical-geographic
characteristics are important for where illegal logging is
likely to be a problem. On average, countries in the tropics
are more likely to suffer from illegal logging activities than
others. This is not least because these countries typically
offer more opportunities for the illegal commercial harvesting of high-value species. Somewhat surprisingly, I did not
find that the extent of forest area is related to illegal logging.
Likewise, I did not find support for neo-Malthusian theory,
suggesting that population growth has an effect on illegal
logging activities.
A series of factors relating to the level and speed of a
country’s economic-institutional development turned out
to be of great importance for whether illegal harvesting of
wood is likely to be a problem. Higher levels of economic
development (i.e. GDP per capita) were found to be significantly associated with lower levels of illegal logging. The
analysis also supports the hypothesis that high economic
growth rates are related to increased illegal logging. This
is consistent with the notion that commercialization and
growth of timber markets as driven by domestic demands
lead to increased illegal logging. In contrast, the level of foreign demand and the extent to which a country is integrated
into the international trading system were found to be less
important. This finding indirectly supports recent evidence
that the majority of illegal timber is consumed in domestic
markets and does not enter international trade (e.g. Hoare
2015; Gan et al. 2016).
Three dimensions of institutional quality turned out to
be significantly associated with illegal logging: voice and
accountability, rule of law and control of corruption. These
results do not come unexpectedly since numerous studies
have identified a lack of democracy, the presence of corruption and a weak rule of law as important impediments to
progress in reducing illegal logging. Yet, I found no support
for the idea that government effectiveness and regulatory
quality are associated with illegal logging activities. Likewise, higher political stability is not significantly related to
lower levels of illegal logging. This finding indirectly supports recent evidence that the impact of conflicts and wars on
forests may be much more complex than commonly assumed
(Burgess et al. 2015; Landholm et al. 2019). Note also that
there is no significant correlation between a country’s
intentional homicide rate (as a proxy for overall violence)
and illegal logging (see "Appendix 2"), despite numerous
reports of criminal violence in the context of illegal logging
in recent years (e.g. Reboredo 2013; van Solinge 2014).
For future research, it seems obvious that more up-todate estimates about illegal logging and the associated timber trade are urgently needed. Moreover, longitudinal data
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on illegal logging would allow the development of more
sophisticated models to further check the robustness of the
results. Then, one could also conduct separate analyses for
each region of the world. This would allow to determine
whether there are regional variations in the pattern of results
presented in this research. Yet, the findings of this study
should preferably also be confirmed in studies with disaggregated data at subnational (e.g. local, provincial) levels.
This would also allow to consider the role and motivations
of different actors (e.g. large-scale commercial logging
companies versus small-scale subsistence users of wood)
as well as their social and cultural values. In addition, the
effects of conflicts, domestic migration and labour market
dynamics (e.g. the number of employment opportunities in
the informal sector) on illegal logging could be investigated
in more detail.
Finally, what are the policy implications of the findings?
At least in the short run, most of the factors that were found
relevant for illegal logging activities can hardly be influenced by policy makers (e.g. governments, international
organizations, conservation groups and the private sector).
Yet, in the longer run, institutional problems like corruption can certainly be tackled, e.g. through measures such as
reducing the discretionary power of government officials,
removing subsidies or administratively fixed prices or opening up the economy to foreign competition (e.g. FAO 2001;
Smith et al. 2003). However, it seems obvious that solving the problem of illegal logging will take more than just
addressing institutional problems alone. Strategies aimed at
reducing the supply of illegal timber need to consider the
complex interplay between the physical-geographic, economic and institutional factors identified in this study—and
are thus difficult and time-consuming to implement. Moreover, such strategies will most likely overlap with broader
development strategies outside the forest sector and thus
require coordination across sectors (e.g. World Bank 2006).
By its very nature, illegal logging is hard to detect. In this
context, this research points to the factors that make the presence of illegal logging activities likely: for instance, high
economic growth rates, high levels of perceived corruption
and a weak rule of law are an indication that illegal harvesting of wood might be more of a problem than elsewhere.
Policy makers and stakeholders involved in the fight against
illegal logging should thus place their focus on countries
with the identified framework conditions. Furthermore, the
results of this analysis could contribute to determining the
degree of risk of the country of origin—a procedure which is
for instance required in the due diligence practice of operators (i.e. importers of timber and forest products) under the
EU Timber Regulation (Leipold 2017).

European Journal of Forest Research (2021) 140:1049–1064

1059

Appendix 1: Countries included (IL = 0 means low illegal logging, and IL = 1 means high illegal
logging in 2004)
Country

IL

Country

IL

Country

IL

Country

IL

Country

IL

Country

IL

Afghanistan
Albania
Algeria

0
1
1

0
0
1

Georgia
Germany
Ghana

1
0
1

Latvia
Lebanon
Lesotho

0
0
0

Swaziland
Sweden
Switzerland

1
0
0

1
0
0
0
0

1
0
1
0
1

Greece
Guatemala
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Guyana

0
0
1
1
0

Liberia
Libya
Lithuania
Macedonia
Madagascar

1
1
0
0
1

Pakistan
Panama
Papua New
Guinea
Paraguay
Peru
Philippines
Poland
Portugal

1
0
1

Angola
Argentina
Armenia
Australia
Austria

0
1
1
0
0

Tajikistan
Tanzania
Thailand
Togo
Tonga

0
0
0
1
0

Azerbaijan

1

Canada
Cape Verde
Central African
Rep.
Chad
Chile
China
Colombia
Congo Dem.
Rep.
Congo Rep

1

Haiti

0

Malawi

1

Qatar

0

0

Bahamas
Bahrain
Bangladesh
Barbados

0
0
1
0

Costa Rica
Cote d’Ivoire
Croatia
Cyprus

1
1
0
0

Honduras
Hungary
Iceland
India

1
0
0
0

Malaysia
Mali
Malta
Mauritania

1
1
0
1

0
1
1
0

1
0
0
0

Belarus
Belgium
Belize
Benin
Bhutan
Bolivia
Bosnia-Herzegovina
Botswana

0
0
0
1
0
1
0

Czech Rep
Denmark
Dominica
Dom. Republic
Ecuador
Egypt
El Salvador

0
0
0
0
0
1
0

Indonesia
Iran
Iraq
Ireland
Israel
Italy
Jamaica

1
0
0
0
0
0
0

Mauritius
Mexico
Moldova
Mongolia
Morocco
Mozambique
Myanmar

1
0
0
0
0
1
1

Romania
Russia
Rwanda
Saint Vincent
& G.
Samoa
Sao Tome & P.
Saudi Arabia
Senegal
Serbia & M
Sierra Leone
Singapore

Trinidad &
Tobago
Tunisia
Turkey
Turkmenistan
UAE

0
1
0
1
0
1
0

Uganda
Ukraine
UK
Uruguay
USA
Uzbekistan
Vanuatu

1
0
0
0
0
0
0

0

1

Japan

0

Nepal

0

Slovakia

0

Vietnam

1

1
0

Equatorial
Guinea
Estonia
Ethiopia

1
1

Jordan
Kazakhstan

0
0

Netherlands
New Zealand

0
0

0
0

Zambia
Zimbabwe

1
0

1
1
1
1
1

Fiji
Finland
France
Gabon
Gambia

0
0
0
1
1

Kenya
Korea, Rep.
Kuwait
Kyrgyzstan
Laos

1
0
0
0
1

Nicaragua
Niger
Nigeria
Norway
Oman

1
1
1
0
0

Slovenia
Solomon
Islands
South Africa
Spain
Sri Lanka
Sudan
Suriname

Brazil
Brunei Darussalam
Bulgaria
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Cambodia
Cameroon

0
0
0
1
0
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Appendix 2: Pearson’s correlation coefficients between the model variables
and development‑related variables Human Development Index (HDI), urbanization
and intentional homicides (coefficients significant at 5% are in bold)
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

(10)

(11)

(12)

(13)

(1) Illegal 1.000
logging
(2) Voice − 0.456 1.000
and
accountability
− 0.411 0.701 1.000
(3)
Political
stability and
absence
of violence
(4) Gov- − 0.479 0.820 0.747 1.000
ernment
effectiveness
(5) Regu- − 0.442 0.842 0.728 0.949 1.000
latory
quality
(6) Rule of − 0.505 0.855 0.815 0.957 0.929 1.000
law
(7) Con- − 0.490 0.799 0.770 0.956 0.902 0.957 1.000
trol of
corruption
(8) GDP − 0.574 0.601 0.645 0.794 0.772 0.755 0.753 1.000
per
capita
0.202 − 0.278 − 0.104 − 0.181 − 0.185 − 0.204 − 0.234 − 0.076 1.000
(9) Economic
growth
0.042 0.109 0.023 0.137 0.137 0.090 0.104 0.177 0.025 1.000
(10)
Exports
of industrial
roundwood
(11) Popu- 0.345 − 0.443 − 0.306 − 0.356 − 0.361 − 0.324 − 0.293 − 0.347 0.145 − 0.190 1.000
lation
growth
0.349 − 0.153 − 0.218 − 0.349 − 0.288 − 0.309 − 0.328 − 0.396 − 0.054 − 0.130 0.281 1.000
(12)
Tropical
climate
(13) Forest 0.138 0.032 − 0.092 0.044 0.043 − 0.016 0.016 0.068 0.010 0.759 − 0.090 − 0.023 1.000
area
(14) HDI − 0.627 0.657 0.630 0.789 0.763 0.762 0.738 0.936 − 0.113 0.185 − 0.521 − 0.415 0.082
− 0.435 0.446 0.479 0.625 0.616 0.575 0.612 0.839 − 0.095 0.178 − 0.247 − 0.376 0.137
(15)
Urbanization

13

(14)

1.000
0.800

(15)

1.000

(16)
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(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)
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(7)

(8)

(9)

(10)

(16) Inten- − 0.076 − 0.115 − 0.253 − 0.279 − 0.206 − 0.321 − 0.275 − 0.189 − 0.067 − 0.143
tional
homicides

(11)
0.105

(12)

(13)

(14)

(15)

(16)

0.379 − 0.046 − 0.225 − 0.102 1.000

HDI: Human Development Index (2000–2004). Source: UNDP (2017).
Urbanization: urban population (% of total; 2000–2004). Source: World Bank (2021).
Intentional homicides: intentional homicides per 100,000 people (2000–2004). Source: UNODC (2020).

Appendix 3: Ordinary least squares regression results (robustness check)
Variables

Specification 1

Specification 2

Specification 3

Specification 4

Specification 5

Specification 6

Constant

0.609***
(0.084)
− 0.020*
(0.011)

0.635***
(0.089)

0.586***
(0.102)

0.598***
(0.101)

0.528***
(0.097)

0.534***
(0.097)

− 0.030**
(0.013)

− 0.029**
(0.012)

− 0.047***
(0.010)
0.007***
(0.002)
0.002
(0.005)
− 0.008
(0.007)
0.001***
(> 0.000)
> 0.000
(> 0.000)
163
0.550

− 0.048***
(0.010)
0.006***
(0.002)
0.001
(0.005)
− 0.007
(0.007)
0.001***
(> 0.000)
> 0.000
(> 0.000)
163
0.549

Voice and
accountability
Political stability
and absence of
violence
Government
effectiveness
Regulatory quality
Rule of law
Control of corruption
GDP per capita

− 0.056***
(0.009)
Economic growth 0.007***
(0.002)
Exports of indus- 0.001
trial roundwood (0.005)
Population
− 0.011
growth
(0.007)
Tropical climate 0.001***
(> 0.000)
Forest area
> 0.000
(> 0.000)
N
163
2
R
0.543

− 0.010
(0.011)
− 0.018
(0.014)

− 0.060***
(0.009)
0.008***
(0.002)
0.001
(0.005)
− 0.008
(0.007)
0.001***
(> 0.000)
> 0.000
(> 0.000)
163
0.536

− 0.054***
(0.011)
0.007***
(0.002)
0.001
(0.005)
− 0.008
(0.007)
0.001***
(> 0.000)
> 0.000
(> 0.000)
163
0.539

− 0.016
(0.014)

− 0.055***
(0.011)
0.007***
(0.002)
0.001
(0.005)
− 0.008
(0.007)
0.001***
(> 0.000)
> 0.000
(> 0.000)
163
0.538

*Significant at the 10% level
**Significant at the 5% level

***Significant at the 1% level. Unstandardized coefficients and standard errors in parentheses
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